In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the efficiency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the parameter c of the auction we can trade off efficiency and running time. Moreover, we show that the auction that gives the desired level of efficiency in expectation takes the same number of rounds for any number of players.
Introduction
A central issue in auction design is to set the rules of the auction so that some economic goals are achieved despite the fact that agents act based on self-interest. The economic goals are often expressed as functions of agents' preferences. Therefore auction design needs to elicit information on agent's preferences.
However requiring elicitation of full and exact preference information is undesirable for several reasons.
First, agents may prefer not to reveal information on their valuations for reasons of privacy or long-term competitiveness [13] . Second, determining one's valuation with a precision up to the last digit can be computationally demanding [9, 12, 14] . Finally, the full revelation of agents' preferences may require a prohibitive amount of communication [5, 11] .
Such considerations lead to an interest in auctions where agents need not reveal their information entirely but only partially. It has been recognized that multi-round mechanisms can reduce revelation and associated with it computation and communication, compared to single-round mechanisms advocated by the revelation principle [1, 3] . One class of multi-round mechanisms are query auctions. In a query auction the auctioneer sequentially queries the agents about specific aspects of their preferences. As an answer to the query an agent can chose one of a finite set of actions. Through incremental querying, the auctioneer gradually collects the information on agents' valuations. By using a query strategy in which previously revealed information guides the selection of subsequent queries, elicitation is focused on pertinent information. Incremental querying has been applied in different settings ( [7, 2] ) and it has been shown that only a small fraction of agents' valuation information needs to be revealed before the (approximately) optimal allocation can be determined [5, 8] .
When evaluating the effectiveness of elicitation we may generally care about the running time expressed in the number of queries required to determine an optimal (according to the specific objective of the designer) allocation [15] . Since information about agents' valuation becomes more refined with each query, a higher number of queries leads to a better allocation. So the question arises how many queries are necessary in order to achieve a desired level of optimality. This has prompted researchers to examine the trade-off between the running time of query auctions and the level of allocation optimality. For example, in [4] the issue is considered for English auctions when restricting quires to discrete levels. The authors analyze how the choice of query levels in the English auction affects the expected revenue and the expected duration (measured in terms of the number of levels that the query price has been raised through). In [6] limits of query auctions regarding the objective of economic efficiency maximization are shown. It is proven that in a setting with valuations distributed according to a continuous density
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In this paper we are concerned with the issue of the trade-off between running time and allocation efficiency in the recently proposed c-bisection auction [6] . The proposed auction is a query mechanism in which players submit their bids in sequence with full knowledge of all previous bids of other players. The auction is characterized by a parameter c which, together with the distribution from which valuations of players are drawn, determines a sequence of query prices. In [6] equilibrium properties of this auction are analyzed. It is shown that the auction has an ex-post equilibrium, called the bluff equilibrium, and under this equilibrium the auction ends in finite time, regardless of the realization of players' valuation.
Due to the result mentioned above we know that inefficiency of the bluff equilibrium for some realizations of valuations is inevitable.
In this paper we discuss in detail the performance of the c-bisection auction under the bluff equilibrium.
In particular, we study how the choice of parameter c and the number of participating players impact the running time of the auction and its (in)efficiency.
First, we investigate the running time of the auction according to two measures, namely the expected number of rounds and the expected number of queries performed in the auction. 5 For both measures we derive first a recursive formula and give then an upper bound for the function defined by this formula.
We prove that for a fixed c the expected number of rounds is bounded by a function that is logarithmic in the number of players while the expected number of queries is bounded by a function that is linear in the number of players. Second, we analyze the level of inefficiency of the auction. As measures of inefficiency we employ the probability of inefficient allocation and the expected loss of efficiency. For the probability of inefficient allocation we derive a recursive formula and prove that it's not more than c for any number of players.
The level of the expected loss of inefficiency we estimate by using computer simulation. We show that when valuations are uniformly drawn from [0, 1) the expected loss of efficiency is bounded from above by c 2 for any number of players. It means that by choosing the appropriate c, the minimum level of efficiency can be determined by the auctioneer before it is known how many players will participate in the auction.
Furthermore we show that for a fixed number of players there is a trade-off between efficiency and running time: for the increasing efficiency of the auction we have to pay by the increasing number of rounds and the increasing number of queries. By simulation it turns out that the trade-off curves, which show the relation between the expected number of rounds and the expected loss of inefficiency, constructed for different numbers of players coincide with each other. It means that in expectation the number of rounds of the auction that obtains a desired level of efficiency is independent of the number of players.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the rules of the c-bisection auction. In Section 3 the running time of the auction is analyzed. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the efficiency of the auction. Concluding remarks about the trade-off are reported in Section 5. The Appendixes contain proofs of some statements and theorems.
The c-bisection auction
First, we introduce a general bisection auction and then a specific type of it, the c-bisection auction. Before the start of the auction there is a lottery that determines the order of the players. W.l.o.g. we assume that this ordering is 1
The auction runs for an a priori indefinite number of rounds. Each round is characterized by payment p r , query price q r , upper bound u r and a set of active players A r . The payment specifies the price to be payed if a player wins in this round. The query price is used by the auctioneer to ask an active player whether his valuation is larger than or equal to the query price. Players are queried openly in increasing order, so that a player can observe the bids of his predecessors. In each round the query price is a point in (p r , u r ).
The initial set of active players is A 1 = N . The auction starts with p 1 = α and u 1 = β and q 1 is a point in [α, β). Given the current set A r , the payment p r , the query price q r , the upper bound u r and the bids of players in round r the characteristics of the next round r + 1 are defined as follows. If all players submit a no bid they all remain active, i.e. A r+1 = A r . The payment remains the same and the upper bound is set to the previous query price, i.e. p r+1 = p r and u r+1 = q r . If at least two players submit a yes bid, all players that said yes remain active. The upper bound remains the same and the payment is set equal to the previous query price, i.e. u r+1 = u r and p r+1 = q r . The new bounds determine a new query price q r+1 in (p r+1 , u r+1 ). If only one player submits a yes bid the auction stops, this player wins the auction and pays p r . If such a moment doesn't occur, i.e. at least two players remain always active, the winner is determined according to the order of players: among those players who remain active the player with the highest ranking wins. The price the winner pays is equal to the limit of the sequence of the payments that occurred in the subsequent rounds in the auction. Since the sequence of payments is increasing this limit is equal to the supremum of the payments.
In the special type of a bisection auction, called c-bisection auction, the query price is defined as follows.
For any c ∈ (0, 1) and any continuous probability distribution with cumulative density F (v) from which valuations of players are drawn, in any round r, given the payment p r and the upper bound u r , the query price q r is chosen such that 
The following strategy, called the bluff strategy, constitutes a symmetric ex-post equilibrium in the cbisection auction (this result is proven in [6] ). An ex-post equilibrium is a strategy profile such that,
given any realization of valuations, the plan of actions prescribed by the strategy to a player is a best response to the plans of actions prescribed by the strategies of the other players. Under the bluff strategy an active player i having valuation v i says yes in round r whenever:
2. p r ≤ v i < q r and no active predecessor of him said yes in this round.
The following example illustrates how the auction proceeds under the bluff equilibrium.
Example. Suppose five players with valuations uniformly distributed on [0, 1) participate in the cbisection auction with c equal to 0.5. Suppose that according to the lottery the ordering of players is Notice that the outcome in the example is not efficient -the winner is not the player with the highest valuation. But as we have already pointed out inefficiency for some realizations of valuations is inevitable.
Later in the paper we investigate how inefficient this auction is by analyzing the probability of inefficient allocation and the expected loss of welfare.
Probability distribution of players actions. In the remaining part of the paper we focus on auction performance in expectation. In order to analyze the expected performance we need to know the probability of particular actions of players. Namely, we need to know the probability of saying yes and no by an active player under the bluff strategy.
Recall that in any round r of the c-bisection auction the query price q r is determined in such a way that, given that the valuation of a player is in [p r , u r ), the probability that his valuation is in [p r , q r ) is equal to c. Write i r := min{i | i ∈ A r } -among the active players in round r the one with the lowest ranking; j r := min{i | i ∈ A r , i = i r } -among the active players in round r the one with the second lowest ranking.
First let's observe that when player i r says no for the first time, player j r says yes with certainty. Indeed, in all previous rounds player i r said yes and since j r is active in round r also he said yes in those rounds.
Both the payment and the query price increased so that p r = q r−1 . Since player j r follows the bluff strategy his previous yes decision implies that v jr ≥ q r−1 = p r . If in round r player i r says no, player j r is in the situation where he doesn't have any active predecessor with yes decision and therefore says yes whenever his valuation is not smaller than p r , that is with certainty. It follows that after round r player i r drops out so that i r+1 = j r . Notice that in the equilibrium in every round r either player i r or player j r (or both) say yes. It means that in the equilibrium only players with yes decision remain active. It implies that the upper bound always remains the same so that u r = β for any r, the payment and the query price increase, so that p r = q r−1 for any r > 1.
Second, we need to know the probability that player i r says yes in round r. Having no active predecessor player i r says yes iff v ir ≥ p r . Since p 1 = α player i 1 in round 1 says yes with certainty. Now let's show that for any r > 1 the probability that player i r says yes in round r equals 1 − c. Regarding the identity of player i r there are two possibilities -either i r = i r−1 (happens if decision of i r−1 was yes)
or i r = j r−1 (happens if decision of i r−1 was no and consequently decision of j r−1 was yes). In both cases the decision of player i r in round r − 1 was yes implying that
The last equality holds because q r−1 divides the interval (p r−1 , β) exactly in such a way that this conditional probability is equal to 1 − c.
Further, we need to know the probability of saying yes in round r for any player i = i r , i ∈ A r . We can distinguish two cases. First, consider the case where player i says yes in round r. From the fact that i ∈ A r follows that player i r said yes in round r − 1 and thus v i ≥ q r−1 . In round r he says yes iff
The last equality holds because q r divides the interval (p r , β) exactly in such a way that this conditional probability is equal to 1 − c.
Secondly, consider the case where player i r says no in round r. As we described above player j r says yes with certainty. For any other player i the situation is the same as in the previous case and thus also here player i ∈ N \{i r , j r } says yes with probability 1 − c.
Now notice that the analysis above was done without specifying the distribution function from which valuations of players are drawn. Due to the price setting rule of the c-fraction auction the obtained probability results hold regardless of the distribution function of valuations. Thus, in the remaining part of the paper, namely in Section 4, for simplicity of argumentation we focus on the setting where valuations of players are independently drawn from the uniform distribution in [0, 1). Moreover, it could be seen from the analysis above that the probability of saying yes or no by an active player doesn't depend on the round. It enables us to derive recursive (in number of active players) formulas for the expected number of rounds and the expected number of queries performed in the auction.
Running time of the auction
In this section we investigate the expected running time of the c-bisection auction if the bluff strategies are played. We analyze two measures, namely the expected number of rounds and the expected number of queries performed in the auction before the winner is found. As a query we consider each separate question of the auctioneer to an active player. As a round we consider a sequence of queries in which each active player is asked to act exactly once. For both measures we derive first a recursive formula and give then an upper bound for the function defined by this formula.
The expected number of rounds
Let e c (k) be the expected number of rounds of the auction with k active players, given that the decision of the active player with the lowest ranking is yes in the current round; and e * c (k) be the expected number of rounds given that this decision is no. Consider round r with n active players and suppose that the decision of player i r in the current round is yes. The current round contributes 1 to e c (n)
Now recall that if player i r+1 says no player j r+1 says yes with certainty, which causes player i r+1 to drop out of the auction. Thus, e * c (2) = 1 and e * c (k + 1) = e c (k) for any k > 1. This is used in Appendix A to rewrite the above recursive relation to
This formula is valid for any n ≥ 2.
Now notice that since in the first round player i 1 says yes with certainty, the expected number of rounds of the auction of n players is equal to e c (n). Thus using formula 2 we can compute the expected number of rounds in the auction of n players. Plugging in n = 2 yields e c (2) =
c (2−c) . All other values can be determined recursively. Table 1 Generally we show that the expected number of rounds of the auction is bounded from above by a function that is logarithmic in the number of players. A comparison of the bound with the computed results suggests that this bound is not tight. It can be easily checked that for a fixed value of c the ratio between the bound and the computed result is approximately constant (as a function of n), implying that the bound has likely the correct order of magnitude.
The expected number of queries
Let b c (k) be the expected number of queries of the auction with k active players, given that the decision of the active player with the lowest ranking is yes in the current round; b * c (k) be the expected number of queries given that this decision is no. Notice that in a round with k active players k queries are performed. Following the same argumentation as we used for determining the formula for the expected number of rounds we find that for any n ≥ 2
Again, notice that when player i r+1 = i r says no player j r+1 says yes with certainty, which causes player This is used in Appendix B to derive the following recursive relation. For any n ≥ 2
Now notice that since in the first round player i 1 says yes with certainty, the expected number of queries in the auction of n players is equal to b c (n). Thus using formula 4 we can compute the expected number of queries performed in the auction of n players. Plugging in n = 2 yields b c (2) =
2+2c(1−c)
c (2−c) . All other values can be determined recursively. Table 2 Generally we show that the expected number of queries is bounded from above by a function that is linear in the number of players. 
Proof. See proof in Appendix B.
A comparison of the bound with the computed results suggests that this bound is not tight. It can be easily checked that for a fixed value of c the ratio between the bound and the computed result is approximately constant (as a function of n), implying that the bound has likely the correct order of magnitude.
Efficiency of the auction
In this section we investigate the efficiency of the c-bisection auction when the bluff equilibrium is played.
In particular we compute the probability of inefficient allocation and the expected loss of efficiency. Here for simplicity of argumentation we focus on the setting where valuations of players are independently drawn from the uniform distribution in [0, 1).
In order to compute these measures of inefficiency it is convenient to consider the direct revelation mechanism associated with the bluff equilibrium. We construct a direct auction that mimics the bluff strategies of the c-bisection auction. 
The direct c-bisection auction

Consider the following direct auction (w d , p d ), called the direct c-bisection auction. For r ∈ N, write
else. Generally, it is shown in [6] 
Notice that the first condition always holds if |I r(v)
|
that for any realization of valuations
equals the outcome of the c-bisection auction when players, having these valuations, follow the bluff strategies. Consequently, by the revelation principle [10] truth telling is a dominant strategy in the direct c-bisection auction. Due to this result the efficiency performance of both the c-bisection query auction under the bluff equilibrium and the direct c-bisection auction under the truth telling equilibrium are the same. Thus it suffices to compute the probability of inefficient allocation and the expected loss of efficiency for the direct c-bisection auction under the truth telling equilibrium.
The probability of inefficient allocation
We derive a recursive formula for the probability of inefficient allocation and give an upper bound for the function defined by this formula. First notice that the direct c-bisection auction restricted to the interval [c, 1) with k players having valuations uniformly drawn from this interval has identical form and structure as the original direct auction with k players having valuations uniformly drawn from [0, 1).
Let's denote by P n the probability that the auction with n players terminates in an inefficient allocation.
First, consider the case where the valuations of all players are smaller than c. The probability of this event is c n . In this case the auction is only efficient if the player with the lowest ranking has the highest valuation. By symmetry this happens with probability 1 n . Thus this case contributes n−1 n c n to P n .
Next consider the case where k players have valuations larger than or equal to c and n − k players have valuations smaller than c. It happens with probability
so this case adds zero to P n . For k > 1 the auction can be inefficient and due to the structural similarity, inefficiency takes place with probability P k . Hence,
This can be rewritten to the following recursive relation,
2−c and for n > 2:
Direct computation of this expression for different combinations of n and c gives the values that are plotted in Figure 3 . In general, we show the following upper bound on P n .
Proof. See proof in Appendix C.
This theorem shows in particular that by choosing an appropriate fraction c in the auction we can make the probability of inefficiency as small as we like, independent of the number of players!
The expected loss of efficiency
The economic efficiency (or welfare) of an auction is equal to the valuation of the winner. Thus given a realization of valuations v = (v i ) i∈N , the welfare achieved by the auction is the valuation of
The expected loss of welfare, denoted by L n , is the expected value of this difference. To estimate the value of L n we simulated the direct c-bisection auction and ran it for valuations uniformly and independently drawn from the interval [0, 1). For each combination of value c and number of players n we ran 10000 trials. Figure 4 shows the 99% confidence interval for the expected loss of welfare. It is interesting to notice that the maximum expected loss doesn't arrive at the minimum number of players.
In general, we show the following statement.
Figure 4: The expected loss of efficiency, 99% confidence interval.
Proof. Let v = (v i ) i∈N be a realization of valuations for which the allocation in the direct c-bisection auction is not efficient. In other words,
Hence, L n ≤ cP n . Applying the result of Theorem 4.1 completes the proof.
As for probability of inefficient allocation, by choosing an appropriate fraction c in the auction we can limit the expected loss of efficiency to an arbitrary chosen level, independent of the number of players.
The following result shows that the expected loss of welfare even tends to zero when the number of participants becomes large.
Theorem 4.3
The expected loss of welfare L n tends to zero for large n.
Concluding remarks: trade-off between efficiency and running time
From the analysis above we derive the following relation between the value of c, the level of efficiency and the running time. For a fixed number of players, a smaller fraction c leads to a lower expected loss of efficiency and lower probability of inefficient allocation. But at the same time it leads to a higher expected number of rounds and queries. Thus, increasing running time is a price that we have to pay for Appendix A. Derivations, proofs and tables for Subsection 3.1
Derivation of formula 2
Let's denote by
Using the facts that e * c (2) = 1 and e * c (k + 1) = e c (k) for all k ≥ 2 we can rewrite formula 1 as follows:
This can be rewritten to
Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove Theorem 3.1 we introduce several notations and lemmas.
Proof. It's enough to show that ln
We have
c (2−c) and for any n > 2
Lemma 5.2 For any n ≥ 2 and any c ≤ 1 2 , E n ≤ 1 + log a n, with base a = . Suppose E k ≤ 1 + log a k for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Using the induction hypothesis,
Since the logarithm with base a = 1 1−c is concave, we know that if λ k ≥ 0 and
= 1 + log a n.
The last inequality holds since for any c ≤ 1 2 and any n ≥ 2 it holds that
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The basis of the induction is trivial since e c (2) = E 2 and D 2 > 1.
Suppose that e c (k) ≤ E k · D k is true for any 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Notice that D n ≥ D n−1 ≥ . . . ≥ D 2 > 1.
Thus, using the recursive formula for e c (n) and the induction hypothesis, 
which completes the proof.
Combining the results of Lemmas 5.1 -5.3 we get that for any c ≤ 1 2 and any integer n ≥ 2, e c (n) ≤ C(log a n + 1) with constant C = e 
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Define 
